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Introduction
As Stephen Darwall has noted, the fundamental ethical motive in the 
moral philosophy of Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) is love. It is fundamen-
tally an ethics of motive and character, rather than of duty or law (The British 
Moralists and the Internal Ought, 128–29).1 However, in Cudworth’s view, it is 
God’s love that makes morality possible. In his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 13 
in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), Cudworth states that 
God’s love is the ‘source, life, and soul of all morality’. It is the ‘inward life’ of 
humans, without which they are destitute of ‘true morality, virtue, and grace’ 
(True Intellectual System, 205). Cudworth does think that by the development 
of virtuous habits humans can affect the degree to which moral goodness 
manifests in them, but he is clear that true righteousness is not attainable 
by free will alone but only with the assistance of divine grace. However, he 
has little to say about grace in his published works. By contrast, he discusses 
 1 For an account of love in Cudworth, see Armour, ‘Trinity, Community, and Love’, and 




grace at some length in a large collection of manuscript writings on the topic 
of free will, most of which remain unpublished (British Library Additional 
MSS 4978–4982, hereafter by number and folio only), and these unpublished 
writings will be the main focus of this essay.2
On the one hand, as Darwall notes, Cudworth wants to counter the view 
that the will blindly follows the understanding. He insists instead that moral 
agents act not just on speculative (‘notional’) beliefs, but on motivational 
states (The British Moralists and the Internal Ought, 136). To use Cudworth’s 
own expression, ‘The first principle by which good and evil are distinguished 
is vital and not notional’ (4982, 9r). In other words, inclination/instinct de-
termines the will, not mere speculative intellect, otherwise (as Cudworth 
says) achieving perfect moral goodness would be just like learning the dem-
onstration of a theorem in euclid (4982, 10r).3 Belief that such and such an 
action is best is impotent to prompt action, which only inclinations/instincts 
can achieve.
On the other hand, Cudworth wants to resist moral voluntarism or the 
view that morality is the creation of the will of God or of secular magistrates. 
Instead he defends an innatist view of morality (The British Moralists and the 
Internal Ought, 117–118). He is always very clear that human beings are not 
self-makers morally speaking, but true righteousness is something they find 
within themselves:
 2 These manuscripts currently remain unpublished except for 4978, which has been edited 
by Sarah Hutton and published as A Treatise of Freewill together with his A Treatise concern-
ing Eternal and Immutable Morality. Selections from the other volumes are being prepared 
for publication by the Cambridge Platonists Project, for which see https://cambridgeplaton-
ists.org/. This essay focuses particularly on volumes 4980, 4981, and 4982, all of which have 
been under-studied. All citations from the manuscripts, as from Cudworth’s and Henry More’s 
published works, are in modernised spelling and capitalisation, with some silent editorial 
punctuation to increase clarity. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth remains the fullest treatment of the 
manuscripts. Carter, The Little Commonwealth of Man, and Darwall, The British Moralists and 
the Internal Ought also discuss the manuscript writings at some length. I wish to express here 
my great indebtedness to my colleague Mark Burden both for his transcription of the long pas-
sage on grace from volume 4981 as well as for his many astute comments on an earlier version 
of this essay.
 3 See Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought, p. 137. See also Carter, The 
Little Commonwealth of Man, pp. 114–118 on Cudworth’s contrasting accounts of morality as 
founded in love, versus the more ‘geometrical’ approach in his Treatise concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality.
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righteousness and holiness are not things produced by man’s self-activity or 
free will, not artificial or self-made things, but they are a life nature or spirit and 
that free will is only a power whereby we can promote ourselves toward it . . . or 
remove and estrange ourselves from it.
(4982, 47r)
This innatist conception of moral goodness was shared by his fellow Cam-
bridge Platonist Henry More, who offered a general definition of virtue as 
an ‘intellectual power of the soul’ in chapter 3 of his Enchiridion Ethicum 
(1667) – translated by edward Southwell as An Account of Virtue (1690) – 
adding the following explanation:
it seems fit . . . to call virtue rather a power than a habit...because a habit is not 
essential to virtue. For if a man had this intellectual power born in him, he 
would doubtless be virtuous, though it came not to him in the way of repeated 
actions, such as constitute a habit. For it is not the external causes, but the in-
ternal, which make the essence of a thing.4
(More, tr. Southwell, An Account of Virtue, 12)
In other words, for both Cudworth and More, virtue is not something ‘self-
made’ like an acquired skill. Instead, however obscured by sin, true righteous-
ness is pristinely fully formed in humans, as if the excellence of a musical skill 
was fully formed in somebody without their having had to learn it.
However, although Cudworth does state clearly that moral goodness is not 
itself a production of human free will, his rejection of theological voluntarism 
and his defence of an innatist conception of morality left him open to accusa-
tions of Pelagianism. This is because his innatist conception may nevertheless 
give the impression that humans have the full resources to be moral within 
them, and in this sense are morally autonomous from God. In the freewill 
manuscripts, Cudworth explicitly repudiates ‘Pelagians’5 as those who are:
 4 ‘Malui definire virtutem vim quandam quam habitum…quia habitus non est de essentia 
virtutis; quoniam si quis natus esset cum hac intellectuali vi quam describo, proculdubio vir-
tute esset praeditus, tametsi ex crebris actibus non esset profecta. Causae enim externae non 
sunt de essentia rei, sed solummodo internae’ (More, Enchiridion Ethicum, pp. 9–10).
 5 Post-reformation, the category ‘Pelagian’ becomes very wide, and gets used polemically 
against anybody who offers a robust defence of the role of human freewill in the work of salva-
tion and true righteousness. More strictly, following Rees, a Pelagian may be defined as some-
body who denies original sin, denies that God’s grace is necessary for salvation, and affirms 
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supposed to assert an absolute independence of the creature upon God as to all 
moral good . . . and introduce that impiety that God is not to be prayed to at all 
for any inward perfection of the mind, nor thanked for it afterward, but it is to 
be ascribed to ourselves.
(4980, 33r)
He is quite explicit that:
Liberum arbitrium . . . doth no way exclude the assistance of divine grace and 
providence without which it  would be insufficient of itself to keep men in 
a state of  virtue but much more [insufficient] to recover any that are deeply 
lapsed into wickedness.
(4980, 36r)
However, Cudworth does appear to lean to the Pelagian side of the grace/
free will controversy in many passages, especially when he offers an account 
of what it must mean for humans to enjoy free will, as for instance here in 
MS 4980:
Though the essence of freewill be not . . . mere indifferency and contingency, 
these being no active powers, yet it is most true that contingency or non-ne-
cessity is a pathos or affection that intimately belongs to this natural power in 
a certain sense. For it is impossible to conceive self-power (that is a power of 
actuating, intending and exerting of one’s self more or less) without a freedom 
from inward natural necessity . . . that is, without contingency or an ambiguous 
possibility both ways . . . . Motives and considerations and outward circum-
stances may {sometimes} incline to the intending and exerting of one’s self, 
but they do not thereby impose an absolute necessity upon all the consequent 
degrees of self-intention, but it is still in the {hands of that} power of that which 
comprehends the whole soul . . . the το ηγεμονουν or ruling principle to con-
tinue to actuate or put forth itself more or less.
(4980, 39r–38v)6
that by the right use of free will, a baptised Christian can remain sinless (Pelagius, 90). See also 
Leech, ‘Cudworth on Superintellectual Instinct’, pp. 12–14.
 6 All of this quotation except for the first sentence appears on folio 38v, and is probably 
a slightly later insertion to the passage on folio 39r, which it faces. Here and elsewhere, text 
which appears in { } has been crossed out in the manuscript, whereas text written in italics has 
been added as superscript or subscript.
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This seems to imply that despite what Cudworth wants to say, the element 
of indifference implied by freedom means that it is hard for him to account 
for how grace could be necessary to the achievement of true righteousness 
without thereby negating human freewill. Indeed, Michael Gill states that 
Cudworth’s ‘official’ position that God’s grace is necessary to the achievement 
of true righteousness and salvation ‘just doesn’t fit with anything else Cud-
worth says about “Real Inward Righteousness” . . . the externality and pas-
sivity of this need clash with the insistence on internality and activity that 
underlies everything else he says’. If righteousness is internally accessible to 
humans, humans should in principle have the capacity to overcome sin (The 
British Moralists on Human Nature, 71 and 59).7
However, Gill’s analysis does not take account of what Cudworth says about 
grace in the unpublished freewill manuscripts. Turning to the manuscripts, 
it is evident (in a way in which it isn’t in the published writings) that Cud-
worth does here bother to give philosophical reasons for his claim that human 
freewill is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement 
of true righteousness. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Cudworth seeks to 
justify the necessary role of grace at some length in these unpublished writ-
ings, I nevertheless end up concurring with Gill that this still clashes with the 
general drift of his thinking. I will return to this point towards the end of this 
essay.
Grace in the Freewill Manuscripts
Cudworth is clear throughout the freewill manuscripts that it  is a mis-
take to think about grace as ‘a thing clapped on upon the soul from without, 
a thing wholly foreign to the nature of it’. He denies that grace comes ‘wholly 
from without’, that it is not just an ‘assisting form’, but it is an ‘informing form’ 
(4982, 48r–49r). The point is one about righteousness originating from some-
thing which at least feels ‘external’: regeneration to true righteousness feels 
like an incursion of an alien power from without, but in fact it is a human’s 
 7 Cf. also: ‘[Cudworth] doesn’t even bother to give any philosophical reason for this claim 
[that our active participation] is a necessary condition of our salvation but it is not sufficient . . . 




reversion to their own true self as made in the image of God. In 4981, 70–115 
he elaborates at more length on his understanding of grace. Here Cudworth 
speaks about special grace/power (or ‘peculiar’/extraordinary providence) as 
that form of ‘assistance’ given by the divine love, by which God (as he says) 
‘casts a very compassionate eye’ on humans struggling to turn themselves to 
the path of true righteousness (4981, 78r–79r).
Firstly, I would like to present the essential outlines of Cudworth’s position. 
In presenting the nature of God’s grace, i.e. the action of divine love, he dis-
tinguishes between God’s external assistances (especially, Christ’s propitia-
tory sacrifice), and internal assistances (or ‘divine grace of inward assistance’: 
4981, 80r) as two ways in which God expresses his love for humans (let us 
call these external and internal grace). I will be interested in this essay chiefly 
in the latter kind of grace which works inwardly in the individual. Because 
God wants humans freely to love him, he has given humans free will. In other 
words, Cudworth’s anti-Calvinist position means that he posits a basic anti-
compatibilism between free will and determinism. God cannot determine 
human wills (more generally) to do good or (more specifically) to love him, 
but at most he can only constrain their external acts. But instead of forcing 
humans to love him by ‘violence’, God only tries to coax humans to love him 
by persuasion (4981, 79). He can assist by inclining humans to good without 
destroying their freedom. It is also an aspect of his love for humans that he 
sometimes strategically overrides their freedom, but this does not destroy 
human freedom tout court.8
Nevertheless, he states, humans are not the cause of their own good/salva-
tion. Humans need God’s assistance because they are not on ‘even ground’ 
due to their fallenness, i.e. they are not equally inclined to good and evil but 
are born already biased toward evil. He states that it is an ‘absolute impossi-
bility . . . or a thousand to one’ that humans could achieve true righteousness 
by their own efforts (4981, 77r).9 The free human contribution is the smallest 
part, but it is also a necessary condition, it is just not necessary and sufficient.
 8 Indeed, he states that it  is compatible with freedom that God might even miraculously 
‘metamorphose’ human souls from vice to virtue, prior to their having true faith and conver-
sion to him. In other words, he allows for the (occasional) possibility of irresistible grace, even 
though he also states that saving all in this way would be incompatible with God’s wisdom 
(4981, 74r).
 9 It is not entirely clear why Cudworth thinks that a prior bias to evil should exclude the pos-
sibility of at least a few, through heroic efforts, achieving true righteousness unaided (which 
Cudworth’s addition ‘or a thousand to one’ even seems to suggest).
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By ‘grace’ here, Cudworth seems to mean some superaddition to human ca-
pacities by an external power (i.e. special/’peculiar’ providence), rather than 
an intrinsic power deep within humans’ true selves. What he appears to say 
is that special providence, not just general, is also a necessary condition for 
achieving true righteousness – but it is not necessary and sufficient, except in 
exceptional cases (e.g. the (few) cases of irresistible grace (see above, footnote 
4)). This understanding seems to be implied in his ‘parental’ model of God’s 
love:
God deals with mankind something on that manner as parents do often with 
their children that will let them have something in their own custody as their 
own, but yet not so much as to make them forget themselves and think them-
selves independent in those of whom they received it, and to whom they owe 
their Being but will keep them in continual expectation of new . . . voluntary 
supplies and superadditions, that they may not grow insolent[.]
(4981, 83r)
The obvious interpretation of this passage would be that God loves paren-
tally in the sense that he does not give total moral autonomy to humans, but 
gives some measure of it while exercising heteronomy overall. This is meant 
to contrast with Calvinist theistic fatalism, which Cudworth portrays here 
(and elsewhere) as unloving, because it would imply salvation and damna-
tion by God’s mere will/power without justice.10
But again we also find the contrasting presentation of God’s grace and hu-
man free will in MS 4981 as resistant to the idea that grace comes from with-
out. God, Cudworth also states, wants humans to love him freely – whereas 
a righteousness and devotion ‘clapped on from without’ would not come from 
humans. Instead, ‘in truth God desires from his creatures something that is 
inwardly in themselves; that freely and naturally flows from them and is ac-
tivity . . . in them’ (4981, 84r).
However, this is tempered by Cudworth’s insistence that God always gives 
‘preventing’ (i.e. prevenient, enabling) grace, which humans only subse-
 10 Mindful of the difficulties of squaring God’s justice with natural evil, and the unequal dis-
tribution of grace to non-resistant humans, Cudworth here toys with (without endorsing) the 




quently cooperate with.11 Moreover, in the middle of the passage, Cudworth 
suddenly surprises the reader by making a much more extreme claim (and 
one which seemingly brings him into the camp of his orthodox Reformed 
opponents): the achievement of true righteousness is ‘wholly and entirely to 
be {described} ascribed to God’ (4981, 81r). He justifies this claim by stating 
that ‘freewill itself is in some sense a divine grace’ (4981, 89r).
This is quite arresting, since Cudworth elsewhere clearly distinguishes 
free will from grace. In MS 4980, for instance, he distinguishes three factors 
which conjointly make true righteousness possible:
(1)  First something of nature by which is to be understood common grace, 
for if God in nature had not planted in us a participation of the το θειον, 
holiness and righteousness would have been violent and preternatural 
things and consequently no good at all.
(2)  Secondly there is something also of our own self-exertive conation req-
uisite thereunto to repress the vigour and impetuosity of lower appetites 
and actively to protrude ourselves towards the higher principle which 
the Greeks call το καλον, that which is fair and lovely and worthy of our 
endeavours . . . .
(3)  And lastly the assistance of special grace to make our endeavours and 
activity effectual.
(4980, 84r: numbering and spacing added)
In other words, (1) picks out creation grace, or God’s general providence; 
(3) picks out special grace, God’s special providence; and (2) is human free 
will. But his claim that free will itself is ‘in some sense a divine grace’ collapses 
the grace/self-exertion distinction, and effectively makes his threefold model 
of creation grace, free will and special grace in 4980 a model of three species 
of grace.12 What is doing the work here is a Christian metaphysical intuition 
about humility – humans are strictly speaking causally impotent, they can 
create nothing but instead receive everything as a gift from God, whether 
 11 The notion of prevenient, or enabling, grace – associated particularly with Arminianism – 
is a form of grace which precedes all human initiative. It  enables humans to overcome the 
effects of sin, so that they can freely cooperate with God’s grace in striving for true righteous-
ness. By contrast, this latter form of grace which cooperates with human free will rather than 
precedes it, is what Cudworth calls ‘corroborating’ or ‘promoting’ grace. On Cudworth’s distin-
guishing the types of grace, also below, p. 8.
 12 For a more detailed discussion of this model, see Leech, ‘Cudworth on Superintellectual 
Instinct’, pp. 4–7.
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that gift is naturally or supernaturally given. When (he says) we employ our 
natural capacities as we should, God is ‘justly entitled to the causality of those 
effects’ (4981, 88r).
However, Cudworth’s apparent agreement with orthodox reformed de-
fences of irresistible grace is of course only verbal. In fact, as Carter has noted, 
Cudworth reveals himself in the manuscripts to be a compatibilist about in-
fallible divine foreknowledge and human free will. Much exercised by the 
problem of theological fatalism, Cudworth wants to offer an account of how 
God knows the contingent future and acts providentially in humans’ lives 
while nevertheless preserving human free will.13 He states his position as fol-
lows:
before Pelagius started up it  was generally received doctrine of the ancient 
catholic Christian church & St Austin himself consenting that predetermination 
to glory and election was by prescience and foreknowledge of men’s faith and 
repentance . . . predestination is not the cause of justification and glorification, 
but foreknowledge is before predestination according to that of the scripture 
whom he foreknew them he also predestinated.14
(4981, 85r)
To this position he adds the following precision that divine prescience also 
includes knowledge of what humans would do with divine assistance (pre-
venting and subsequent: see below), not just what they would do through 
their own natures without the aistance of divine grace, which latter position 
he attributes to Pelagius.
In other words, contra those orthodox Reformers who would wish to re-
troproject Calvinism onto the early witness of the church, Cudworth wants 
to establish that antiquity did not ignore freewill as a necessary factor in the 
achievement of true righteousness.
I would like to return now to Cudworth’s closer characterisation of internal 
grace. Cudworth describes this internal grace as follows:
 13 Cf. also Carter The Little Commonwealth of Man, p. 76.
 14 The scriptural verse in question is Romans 8:29, a key battleground in the perennial 
Reformed debates over predestination. The second part of the quotation (‘predestination is 
not… predestinated’) is a translation of Origen’s gloss on this verse in the Philokalia, ch.25. In 
4980 Cudworth also claims the authority of ‘all the ancient doctors of Christianity’ for this syn-
ergistic model of free will and grace, which (he states) are ‘not contradictious to one another . . . 
as many men suppose, who when they hear of freewill think grace is possibly excluded and 
when they hear of grace think freewill is destroyed’ (4980, 37r–38r).
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For grace and providence does not content itself to act . . . remotely only but 
it makes nearer approaches and closer assaults upon the fort and garrison of 
man’s heart. It besieges it, by inward motions and suggestions . . . cogitations 
solicitations and attractions[.]
(4981, 79r)
These higher inward attractions – which take the form of higher impulses, 
feelings, and thoughts – do battle with ‘contrary powers’ (i.e. lower attrac-
tions) to work on humans’ imaginations in a perpetual war between lower 
and higher inclinations. Cudworth describes a ‘triple divine grace’, distin-
guishing three moments in the workings of internal grace:
1. ‘preventing’/‘exciting’ grace preceding all human initiative
2. a subsequent ‘corroborating’ and ‘promoting’ grace
3. a final ‘completing’, ‘confirming’ grace
(4981, 80r)
Notwithstanding his robust defence of free will, Cudworth explicitly states 
here that ‘the inward change of men’s minds towards good’ happens mostly 
by grace (4981, 83r). The immediate model for all this is Origen as he makes 
explicit here and also in MS 4980.15 Cudworth, following the Alexandrian 
church father, states that the true good of rational beings depends ‘mixedly’ 
(i.e. conjointly) of their own prohairesis and divine power/grace, with ‘need 
of both of these’ (4981, 81r).16 Cudworth’s defence of free will in an orthodox 
Reformed context put him under pressure to differentiate his position from 
‘Pelagianism’. In MS 4981 he attempts to exonerate Origen from suspicion of 
the Pelagian heresy. Origen, according to Cudworth, is not Pelagian, for the 
following reason: whereas Pelagius had said that inward grace is not neces-
sary but only useful, Origen had explicitly stated that it was necessary, but 
also that free will was necessary too (although it plays the smaller part).
In effect Cudworth wants to avoid two extremes: one the one hand, ‘Cal-
vinist’ theological fatalism,17 and on the other, the ‘Pelagian’ view that humans 
 15 See for instance 4980, 36r–37r, 59r. On the Origenist influence on Cudworth, see Fuerst, 
‘Autonomie und Menschenwuerde’; Kobusch, ‘Die Idee der Freiheit’.
 16 The reference here is to Origen, Philokalia, ch.26, 99.
 17 See for instance: ‘But to think as some do that man’s will must be totally excluded as to any 
activity of endeavour whatsoever towards God and that all must be done upon him but an ir-
resistible grace . . . this is but a rude and rustical conceit and far from the truth’ (4981, 84r).
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are infinitely free, i.e. they have the capacity for absolute self-determination 
(both views are to some extent his own invention). He denies that these two 
extremes exhaust the options, as though there were no intermediate posi-
tions between these. He states rather that providence wants ‘gently to prolicit 
and draw forth the free principle in men that it may from within its self ac-
tivity display that life of its own which is at once virtue piety . . . and happi-
ness’ (4981, 84r). Cudworth has a very particular reason for insisting on this, 
which is connected with his basic model of grace, namely, the abovemen-
tioned Calvinist theological fatalism.18 This is of course a familiar Cudwor-
thian motif. God wants humans to love him freely: something added by force 
from without isn’t from humans and humans cannot freely give it, nor can 
they offer ‘hearty love’ and ‘devoted affection’ in such a condition (4981, 84r). 
They are instead like manikins who have been constrained by God to love 
him, whereas in reality what God wants from humans is ‘something which 
is inwardly in themselves, that freely and naturally flows from them and is 
activity in them’ (4981, 84r).
In other words, just like contemporary theistic defenders of the free will 
defence for moral evil, Cudworth stresses that God wants humans to love 
him freely, and indeed a world containing free human agents but with the 
possibility (even actualised) of moral evil, is better than a world without free 
human agents but without moral evil. Love, for Cudworth, implies freedom, 
and a love which was forced or determined would be no love at all.
Interestingly, however, Cudworth wishes to play down the extent of the 
role of human effort in achieving true righteousness, while nevertheless pre-
serving a necessary role for it. I would now like to focus on what Cudworth 
says about this effortful turning or conversion of the soul which is in humans’ 
power but nevertheless only a minor ingredient in the achievement of moral 
goodness.
This conversion of the soul from lower to higher objects, Cudworth ob-
serves, is achieved by a cooperation of ‘man’s freewill’ and ‘triple divine grace 
preventing and exciting[,] corroborating and promoting, confirming and 
completing’. However, human freewill is ‘the least part’ of this, grace having 
‘far the greatest share’ (4981, 91r). Making an evident allusion to the allegory 
 18 Cf. ‘they that needs have all to be saved and made good by an irresistible goodness forced 
upon them, they must determine also that all shall be damned by an irresistible wickedness 
which they could not avoid, that is, that either they had a wicked nature or else were made 
wicked by divine fate. To assert either of which is all one as to say that they had no wickedness 
at all in them, but are damned merely by will and power without justice’ (4981, 84r).
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of the cave in Plato’s Republic, Cudworth states that the moral reformation of 
a person’s soul is just as little attributable to his free will, as is the warmth and 
light enjoyed by a person who has been lying in a cold and dark cave, and has 
crawled out into the light and warmth of the sun by degrees. It is to the sun 
that this is attributed, not to the person’s crawling out of the cave, although 
the latter action was also a necessary condition of experiencing the light and 
warmth (4981, 92r).19
Cudworth here stresses the passivity of humans in the achievement of true 
righteousness (‘we are passive to this light and life of God acting upon us’), 
and he is quite explicit that all ‘holy and spiritual’ actions that are done by hu-
mans are by virtue of grace (‘that divine life and spirit’) working in them, the 
human role being reserved exclusively to ‘converting and turning’ to this ac-
tion of grace within them (4981, 92r). This is analogous to how the person in 
darkness can turn himself towards the source of light and warmth, but cannot 
actually produce light and warmth. However, he clearly wishes to distinguish 
this from theological fatalism, stating both that all ‘holy affections pious in-
clinations and spiritual actions’ are not to be attributed to human freewill, 
but to ‘Christ and the Divine Spirit’, but also that humans do not ‘contribute 
nothing’ toward their own conversion, but they contribute the act of turning. 
However, in turning, they do not contribute to the ‘causality’ of true right-
eousness, just as (he says) the person who opens their eyelids to take in the 
sun’s rays cannot claim to have produced those rays from themselves (4981, 
92r). In other words, true righteousness is not (as, for instance, a learned skill 
is) a production of human free will.
However, Cudworth is not always clear about whether the source and cause 
of true righteousness is the action of God’s grace as absolutely distinct from 
humans (special grace), or whether it is an innate capacity in humans – im-
planted in them by general providence (creation grace) – which he variously 
calls ‘superior reason’, ‘intellectual instinct’, and ‘love’ in the manuscripts 
(Darwall, The British Moralists, 144). Cudworth distinguishes clearly between 
two ‘species’ of free will: (1), animal, which is
 19 Cudworth further adds: ‘We have all by nature as it were backs towards the sun of right-
eousness and all that we have to do or can do is only to turn ourselves about towards it and 
open our eyes that we may at once receive the light and warmth of it; and therefore we cannot 
ascribe neither of these to ourselves, but only to God from whom they flow’ (4981, 92r).
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an elevation above particular fancies and appetites by a participation of that in-
ferior reason . . . concerning the interest of the animal life together with a power 
of intending or exerting itself more or less in the use of this inferior reason
(4981, 100r–101r)
and (2), moral, which is:
an elevation above the whole animal life, by the participation of superior reason 
or the instinct of honesty which is the same thing that the Platonists call the το 
αγαθοειδες or the boniform principle20 in the soul, i.e. a sense of good superior 
to all private selfish consideration together with a power of intending and ex-
erting itself by self-active conations towards this higher and diviner principle.
(4981, 101r)
The object of the lower free will is ‘private good of selfish utility’, while the 
object of the higher free will is ‘that universal and unselfish good of honesty 
or the divine life’ (4981, 100r). In other words, we have the capacity to over-
come the animal part of ourselves either by inferior reason (i.e. instrumental 
rationality), where we as it  were subdue one part of our animal will with 
another part of it; or by superior reason/intellectual instinct/’higher’ love, 
where a part of the self which transcends the animal system altogether sub-
dues the animal self.
Cudworth is evidently trying to do justice to the phenomenology of con-
version experience, namely, that conversion to true righteousness is expe-
rienced as happening outside or beyond the control of the will. He insists 
that humans, although free, are not ‘infinite self-power’ – they are not es-
sentially (as it were) self-makers morally speaking, but rather moral good-
ness is innate. Humans do not freely (i.e. ‘indifferently’) create virtues, just 
as God does not freely (i.e. arbitrarily) create moral values, but free will only 
gives humans the capability of turning towards moral goodness. Contrary 
to Pelagius as he represents him, Cudworth is adamant that humans are all 
born in a vicious state, with the will already corrupted rather than a tabula 
rasa (4981, 75r). According to Cudworth, humans do not acquire virtuous 
inclinations by environment and habit only, but instead virtues are innate, 
 20 This corresponds to Henry More’s ‘boniform faculty’ as espoused in his Enchiridion ethi-
cum. See for instance: ‘the boniform faculty of the soul: namely, a faculty of that divine com-
position, and supernatural texture, as enables us to distinguish not only what is simply and 
absolutely the best, but to relish it, and to have pleasure in that alone (Account of Virtue, 6–7).
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implanted in them by God’s general providence (creation grace). The crux 
of the Pelagian/orthodox controversy, according to Cudworth, is that Pelagi-
ans identify righteousness with conformity of actions to outward/written law, 
which is arbitrarily made. Here he repudiates the voluntarism he also finds 
in Pelagius: humans do not just have a ‘customary propensity’ to virtuous ac-
tions, which are learned through habituation, but the virtues already reside 
within them (4981, 89r).
Cudworth, a staunch anti-voluntarist, is quite clear that ‘blind indifferent 
determination’ is not the freedom or power which God enjoys, but ‘Good is 
the measure of power’, and any capacity to do evil or harm oneself is ‘neither 
power nor liberty’ (4981, 99r). In other words, humans do not exercise per-
fect freedom when they act contrary to their own nature – doing good and 
evil indifferently is not perfect freedom. Instead, freedom is ‘intended by God 
and nature only for Good, and whensoever it acts contrary thereunto it is not 
properly the power and perfection, but the abuse of the power’ (4981, 100r). 
However, human beings are not essentially good but only in so far as they 
participate in the goodness of God. At most, humans have:
a certain power over themselves whereby they can intend themselves both in 
a way of consideration and consultation in order to the finding out of what is 
best and also of vigorous exertion resolution and appetites irrationally urging 
a contrary way.
(4981, 99r–100r)
So far it appears that Cudworth has steered a middle course between the 
orthodox Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace on the one hand, and Pela-
gianism on the other. However, Cudworth (as we have seen) also insists that 
righteousness is not a ‘foreign thing clapped upon the soul’, not ‘supernatural’ 
in ‘this sense’. It  is not ‘contrary to true nature of the inward man’ – so in 
effect it is nature in us, but higher nature (4981, 93r). But he also adds that 
righteousness just is ‘the life spirit and nature of God himself, acting upon 
and communicating itself to rational creatures’. He states as well that God is 
not outside us, but is ‘more properly seated and ought more to be sought for 
in fundo animae . . . in the inmost bottom of our own Soul than in the highest 
heavens’ (4981, 91r).
Particularly interesting here is Cudworth’s appeal to heathen authority: the 
heathens too (he says) saw ‘a great cognation betwixt the soul purged from 
what was heterogeneous and alien to it  and God himself ’ (4981, 93r). Al-
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though Cudworth does not cite ancient authorities here, and the intuition 
that nous is divine is of course a common intuition of pagan Greek philoso-
phy in general, we may well suppose that he has foremost in mind the Plotin-
ian doctrine of the undescended intellect. And in a very explicit expression 
of this stance, Cudworth states that grace is ‘nothing but the soul, which was 
before estranged from God, naturalized again to him, and reunited to its true 
source and original’.21 So it is in this sense, Cudworth says, that grace is ‘nei-
ther a violent and forced thing, nor yet merely artificial because it  is to be 
ascribed wholly to God’ (4981, 93r).
This returns us to Gill’s critique. As Gill notes, ‘[Cudworth] tells us how 
we can become one with the mind of God through the use of reason alone. 
There is no need, on this account, for Christ to mediate between humans and 
God, because the rational faculty inside each human turns out to be a means 
of direct access to the mind of God itself ’.22 Certainly something parallel to 
this problem reappears in the freewill manuscripts, since Cudworth seems in 
fact (if not officially) to demote the role of special internal grace. Certainly, 
if humans have the full resources to achieve true righteousness within them 
(i.e. innately), there seems to be a problem about why mediation (of Christ, 
or the Holy Spirit, via special internal grace) should be necessary.
By making human free will itself a product of creation grace, Cudworth 
seems to protect the divine sovereignty and omnipotence and pays lip ser-
vice to the Protestant sola gratia principle. But what is really at stake here 
is whether the cause of true righteousness is human or divine, and in this 
respect Cudworth’s collapsing of the grace/nature distinction looks like an 
equivocation, since he effectively says that everything in the soul is grace. This 
would mean that the innate ‘superior reason’/‘intellectual instinct’/(higher) 
‘love’ in humans is also grace, and therefore humans do not stand in need of 
a special internal grace, but they only need to reach into or reconnect with 
the bottom (fundus) of their souls.
 21 Cf. Gill: ‘[Cudworth] believed that there was as sense in which God is present within each 
of us, a sense in which a reconciliation with God is equivalent to a reconciliation with oneself. 
That is why we should look within – because within each of us is present God Himself . . . each 
of us has within himself a spark of the divine, something that is literally a piece of God’ (The 
British Moralists on Human Nature, p. 29).
 22 Gill is referring to the Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, but the same 
point applies mutatis mutandis in the case of the freewill manuscripts, supplying ‘love’ or ‘su-
perior reason’ for ‘reason’.
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At the basis of this is an ‘innate’/’infused’ confusion – is true righteousness 
innate (i.e. residing in the bottom of human souls), or introduced (i.e. ‘in-
fused’) from without by God? Or, otherwise put, there is a confusion between 
two senses in which grace could be said to be not ‘violent’, either in the sense 
(1) that it is not forced upon humans by an external agent (God), but only 
coaxed; or in the sense (2) that it is part of human nature anyway (i.e. it is 
innate in them). Cudworth does not speak entirely consistently here: on the 
one hand, his ‘parental’ model presents God’s grace as superadded to human 
capacities from without, whereas the passages just cited suggest that the ca-
pacity to be truly righteous is simply the true nature of humans, and is indeed 
just part of the divine life.
The basic Cudworthian picture which emerges here, I think, is the follow-
ing one: (a) human free will does not create moral goodness, but can only 
make the effort to turn towards it; (b) the source of moral goodness is hu-
mans’ true selves=the bottom (fundus) of their souls= God (or ‘God in us’); 
and (c) the actual cause of humans manifesting moral goodness is their true 
self=the bottom (fundus) of their souls=God. Therefore, being passive to the 
‘life of God’ acting upon one, and stating that ‘all truly holy and spiritual 
actions’ are done by grace, is the same as saying that the acquisition of true 
righteousness, in the end, is not achieved through trying to create it through 
effort, but through allowing it naturally to emerge from one’s true nature. In 
other words, humans are not good or love God through effort, but innately/
naturally; the human contribution is only the (effortful) act of turning to this, 
which, however, plays the smallest part.
Conclusion
In conclusion, insofar as Cudworth tends to collapse the notion of grace into 
the innate capacity of ‘superior reason’/‘intellectual instinct’/(higher)‘love’ in 
humans, I am inclined to agree with Gill that Cudworth does not give a sat-
isfactory account of why humans’ freewilled effort is only a necessary but not 
also a sufficient condition of the achievement of true righteousness. On this 
picture, it begins to look like special grace, understood as a power breaking 
into humans’ lives from without to assist them towards moral goodness, has 
become superfluous. verbally Cudworth can claim that he preserves a neces-
sary, and the larger, role for grace, but this is at the cost of collapsing special 
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grace into creation grace. In other words, grace ends up just meaning eve-
rything (including human freewill) which God has created by his general 
providence.
Passmore notes that for Cudworth, the innate capacity of ‘superior 
reason’/‘intellectual instinct’/(higher)‘love’ is not free, but rather is nature in 
us: ‘we do not choose to love in its spiritual sense any more than we choose to 
love in its carnal sense’. But he adds: ‘this does not mean that we must sit back 
and wait until the spirit seizes us: Cudworth says that it is our task to ‘remove 
obstacles’ to the workings of spirit. We can put ourselves (and other people) 
in the way of being ‘invaded’, but we cannot ensure that that invasion will 
take place’ (Ralph Cudworth, 57–58). However, Cudworth’s claim that grace 
is ‘nothing but the soul . . . reunited to its true source and original’ (4981, 93r) 
rather suggests that special grace, strictly speaking, is superfluous, or at least 
obsolescent, in his religious philosophy.23
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Summary
In Cudworth’s view, it  is God’s love which makes morality possible, and true 
righteousness is not attainable by free will alone but only with the assistance of divine 
grace. However, he has little to say about grace in his published works. By contrast, 
he discusses grace at some length in a large collection of manuscript writings on the 
topic of free will, most of which remain unpublished (British Library Additional MSS 
4978-4982). In my examination of what Cudworth has to say about divine grace in 
these manuscripts, I argue that despite the fact that he seeks to justify the necessary 
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role of grace at some length in these writings, Cudworth nevertheless struggles to 
give a satisfactory account of why humans’ freewilled effort is only a necessary but 
not also a sufficient condition of the achievement of true righteousness. On this 
picture, it  begins to look like special grace, understood as a power breaking into 
humans’ lives from without to assist them towards moral goodness, has become 
superfluous. verbally Cudworth can claim that he preserves a necessary, and the 
larger, role for grace, but this is at the cost of collapsing special grace into the ‘natural’ 
graces (including human freewill) which God has created by his general providence.
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